"The Peril of Ease" and Sports Psychology

Yesterday, I came across a blog post written by Dan Devine on Yahoo. In it, he quotes former NBA coach Jeff Van Gundy in a discussion about how well talent translates to performance, in athletics, specifically with regard to basketball and Houston Rocket Tracy McGrady.

"Much of the game was so easy — you see this in the AAU level, where they have freakishly talented players," he continued. "When it's that easy to dominate at that young age because of your physical tools — his wingspan was freakish, his size was enormous, his IQ — my sense was, all that did get in the way of Tracy reaching his highest heights."

The basic principle makes some sense. If you're bigger, stronger, faster and more talented than the competition you're playing against, you're not forced to develop the finer points of your game, because when push comes to shove, you can just rely on your superior gifts to give you the edge you need. And when those gifts start to fade, if you haven't been developing new skills (or sharpening old ones) for a rainy day, you'll find yourself soaking wet in a storm that might just wash you away from the league.

This presents a pretty interesting question: Do the most talented athletes in any sport tend to rely on their talent at the expense of developing, as Devine calls them, the "finer points" of his game? This is an impossible question to answer with complete accuracy, as talent evaluation is largely a subjective discipline. Take Alex Rodriguez, for example. Out of high school, he was the 1st pick in the MLB draft. He was considered extremely talented as a hitter with the potential to play shortstop, a premium defensive position, at the Major League level. Now, I don't know any scouts who were actually tasked with evaluating him, either as an amateur or later as a professional, but many of the reports I read about him indicated that he was a tireless worker, focused on improving all aspects of his game. In fact, his desire to be great may have been so pronounced that it led him to take steroids to improve his game. This does not sound like the "peril of ease" referenced in Devine's post.

Maybe the "peril of ease" varies with each individual player. Maybe some players with elite talent put more pressure on themselves to perform at an elite level, while others try not to wear themselves out when they aren't in between the lines.

Of course, we can never really know for sure what is going on inside the heads of professional athletes, but speculation has always been part of the fun of studying sports.

Judging the process, not the result

In December 2009, much was made of the Yankees' decision to trade for Javier Vazquez, a pitcher coming off a fantastic season (2.77 FIP, 2.82 xFIP). Overall, the initial reaction to the trade was a mix of positive (those who are not afraid of math) and negative (those who believe in ghosts). On paper, at least, it seemed to be a very good deal for the Yankees. They swapped Mike Dunn for Boone Logan, which appeared a wash at the time, and received the added benefit of dumping the near-useless Melky Cabrera on the Braves. However, the crux of the trade came down to the final two pieces involved, Javier Vazquez and prospect Arodys Vizcaino. The Yankees thinking was obviously that Vazquez could be a reliable innings eater at the back end of the rotation, giving them depth behind CC Sabathia, AJ Burnett and Andy Pettitte that they had lacked in 2009. To do so, they were willing to surrender one of their highly touted minor league pitchers in Vizcaino. However, what the Yankees did not know was that Vazquez was going to inexplicably lose 2 miles per hour off his fastball and be, outside of a strong two month period, largely ineffective for them. Had he pitched more like he did in 2009, the Yankees would probably have won the division and could have made more noise in the playoffs than they already did.

It is not inconceivable to believe that had Vazquez's velocity and production stayed consistent, he may have helped the Yankees win the ALCS, when CC Sabathia and Andy Pettitte were their only effective starting pitchers. Furthermore, he may have earned Type A status on the free agent market, granting the Yankees two high draft picks. However, because of the reality of the situation and the end result, the Yankees are left without a top pitching prospect in Vizcaino, and with just one, late first round pick.

This is part of the reason that it is so difficult to evaluate general managers and decisions in baseball. The process is the only thing under control. The result, however, can come out of left field. And unfortunately, particularly in big markets, results receive a lot more attention than processes.

Was Ian Desmond's glove really harmless?

According to Dan Daly, they were, more or less:

● 16 of Desmond’s 34 errors – almost half – resulted in no runs being scored. The pitcher had to face an extra batter, but the Nationals got out of the inning unscathed.

● The last error he made that contributed to an unearned run came on July 29 – the 102^nd game. In the last 60 games he committed 10 errors, but none of them had any effect on the scoreboard.

● His errors cost the Nats perhaps three games, and only one actually caused the winning run to score (May 15 at Colorado).

See? His glove wasn’t that destructive. It just seemed that way.

Unfortunately, Daly's logic here isn't perfect. Beyond the fact that Desmond's glove was harmful enough to result in a -8.8 UZR in 2010, Daly fails to account for the more subtle impact Desmond's errors had on the Nationals. He briefly mentions that the "pitcher had to face an extra batter", but does not acknowledge that extra pitches the pitcher threw at that point to get out of the inning may have impacted him later in the game, or that the pitcher may have continued to pitch as he had been, but needed to exit the game earlier, making way for a less talented middle reliever to enter the game and proceed to surrender runs. Further, the possibility exists that a good reliever would be called into the game, and therefore been unable to pitch in a higher leverage situation later in the week. Obviously, this represents a bit of catastrophic thinking, but the general idea remains the same: in baseball, everything has an effect. Particularly when that "thing" involves giving the opposing team extra outs.

The Red Sox and Stalking

Recently, Red Sox GM Theo Epstein revealed that the Red Sox did a very thorough background check on free agent outfielder Carl Crawford, before signing him to a contract over 7 years for $142 million.

Epstein (courtesy of Full Count @ WEEI):

The more we dug on him, and we covered him as if we were privately investigating him … We had a scout on him literally the last three, four months of the season at the ballpark, away from the ballpark.

Personally, I think the notion of anybody tailing you at all times over the course of several months is jarring, but I would suspect the feeling is even greater when you are in the public eye and make several million dollars per year. That said, its hard to actually blame the Red Sox for doing this, as I have no doubt that it's a practice employed by many other teams in baseball. Any business conducts all the background research possible when making a significant financial investment, and baseball teams are a business, after all.

I do think the next time Epstein conducts an interview about a player he just signed, he may want to leave out a few of the more intimate details.

Why CC Sabathia's Opt-Out Clause Shouldn't Scare the Yankees

The latest piece of news from New York to make headlines is CC Sabathia's first public acknowledgment that he may, in fact, exercise the opt-out clause in his contract after the 2011 season. Sabathia is an elite pitcher, there is no question about that. He has amassed a 19.1 WAR over the past 3 seasons, good for the 5th best total in baseball among pitchers. He possesses a tremendous amount of value, and assuming he stays healthy and does in fact opt out, will undoubtedly be the best free agent hurler available. The opt-out clause will allow him to hit the free agent market at 31 years old, coincidentally (and conveniently) the same age as Cliff Lee when he signed his deal with the Phillies as a free agent last offseason.

Given the fact that Lee received more than one 6-year offer, it is understandable that CC may opt out in an attempt to gain an extra few years on his deal, with a greater annual salary as well. However, considering the fact that CC's deal will already pay him $92 million from 2012-2015, it seems unlikely that a suitor will step up and offer considerably more than that. The only obvious fit for Sabathia (besides the Yankees) would be the Texas Rangers, who allegedly offered Lee six years and $138 million.

To clarify, I do not believe for a minute that the Yankees would let Sabathia go if they could just extend his contract two seasons at the same AAV in order to keep him. But would they be wise to bring him back at that point? It would effectively turn the 7 year, $161 million deal they signed him to prior to the 2009 season into a 9 year, $207 million deal. Sabathia opting out would give the Yankees the chance to pass on the final (and most risky) years of an inherently risky deal, enabling them to fill in the gaps where they see fit without committing nearly $100 million to an over-34 pitcher with a body type that is relatively unstudied (for lack of sample) in baseball. If the Yankees' young pitching (Hughes, Nova, Banuelos, Brackman, Betances) takes a major step forward in 2011 (which is unlikely, granted, for all of those pitchers to make significant progress in one season), letting Sabathia walk may be the right decision.

Since Brian Cashman has assumed "full" (Rafael Soriano-excluded) control of baseball operations, the Yankees have introduced a new focus on the draft, and have some of the best minor league pitching depth in baseball. Maybe they don't have another CC Sabathia among them, or maybe they do, or just maybe, they have enough guys who will develop into solid major league pitchers that this loss will be survivable. Maybe someone among them may benefit from the opportunity presented by the loss of Sabathia, and will provide significant production at a bargain basement price. There are a lot of ifs involved in this, obviously, but I certainly do not believe Sabathia walking away is a death sentence for the Yankees. Rather, it may be a blessing in disguise.

Bloomberg Sports' Front Office 2011

Bloomberg Sports’ Front Office 2011 is the must-have tool for fantasy baseball players. After attending the product’s launch event, I am entirely convinced that this tool will take as much of the guess work as possible out of the fantasy equation.

They have developed a very intricate individual player projection system which is really the basis of the entire operation. Building upon that though, is the ability to sync with Yahoo, ESPN and CBS Sports leagues, and therefore have the entire player ranking system made specifically to the categories used in your league. Why would you want to follow Yahoo’s ranking system when they have a broad system which only focuses on 5x5 leagues, when your league uses OBP, or OPS, or an entirely different set of statistics? The specificity is absolutely invaluable, and is a huge game-changer for fantasy players. However, as great as that feature is, it is only made better by what Bloomberg Sports has built on top of that.

A free agent pick up analyzer will take a look at all of the available free agents, determine who will help you the most in the categories you need the most help in, and recommend players for you to add. Working from that same wavelength is the trade analyzer, which will take a look at your team, the other teams in your league and tell you what trades will be the most beneficial for you to propose, so as long as they are fair for both parties. Anyone can tell you to offer Melky Cabrera for Albert Pujols, but the trade analyzer will tell you who you would need to give up for Albert Pujols, so that the trade works out for you, and is feasible for the other team as well. Additionally, if you have an idea for a specific trade, you can enter that into the system, and it will tell you whether or not it works for you and the other team. As if that was not enough, it explains to you exactly why the trade works for both parties. Finally, the program will make recommendations on who you should start and who you should sit in your lineup on a daily basis.

In summary, the tool helps you draft with the ranking system, improve your team externally with the free agent and trade analyzers and help your team internally with the lineup recommendation system. This tool looks to change the face of fantasy baseball, one championship at a time.

#1 Rule of Fantasy Baseball: Honor the home run ball

Every category in a fantasy league is important, make no mistake. However, in typical 5x5 leagues and generally in leagues with more categories, certain stats have a wider ranging impact. For example, in a 5x5 league, a double will help you in one category (AVG) with the potential to help in two others (RBI and R). A stolen base, meanwhile, contributes in one category for sure with a very small likelihood of helping out in one other (R). By this logic, home runs, which contribute to four stat categories (AVG, HR, R, RBI) are the #1 stat to target when drafting players. Obviously, the percentage of how much more important home runs are than other categories depends on the league and which stats are counted, but almost universally, home runs are far more important than everything else. This gives us the #1 rule of fantasy baseball, which is to NEVER overlook how valuable home runs really are. As an added bonus, because most of the fantasy baseball scene undervalues home runs, drafting players with a particular gift for putting balls in the seats is even easier, and gives you more flexibility to cherry pick the players you want, without worrying as much about someone jumping on one of your targets just before your pick. For example, if you look at the home run totals, you might see Dan Uggla as an extremely valuable player at second base, while almost everyone else will value guys like Utley and Cano more, giving you a great opportunity to draft Uggla without using a very high pick.
All this being said, you should not draft players blindly based on their HR total, but instead, you should weight everything appropriately before deciding to choose a player.