Judging the process, not the result

In December 2009, much was made of the Yankees' decision to trade for Javier Vazquez, a pitcher coming off a fantastic season (2.77 FIP, 2.82 xFIP). Overall, the initial reaction to the trade was a mix of positive (those who are not afraid of math) and negative (those who believe in ghosts). On paper, at least, it seemed to be a very good deal for the Yankees. They swapped Mike Dunn for Boone Logan, which appeared a wash at the time, and received the added benefit of dumping the near-useless Melky Cabrera on the Braves. However, the crux of the trade came down to the final two pieces involved, Javier Vazquez and prospect Arodys Vizcaino. The Yankees thinking was obviously that Vazquez could be a reliable innings eater at the back end of the rotation, giving them depth behind CC Sabathia, AJ Burnett and Andy Pettitte that they had lacked in 2009. To do so, they were willing to surrender one of their highly touted minor league pitchers in Vizcaino. However, what the Yankees did not know was that Vazquez was going to inexplicably lose 2 miles per hour off his fastball and be, outside of a strong two month period, largely ineffective for them. Had he pitched more like he did in 2009, the Yankees would probably have won the division and could have made more noise in the playoffs than they already did.

It is not inconceivable to believe that had Vazquez's velocity and production stayed consistent, he may have helped the Yankees win the ALCS, when CC Sabathia and Andy Pettitte were their only effective starting pitchers. Furthermore, he may have earned Type A status on the free agent market, granting the Yankees two high draft picks. However, because of the reality of the situation and the end result, the Yankees are left without a top pitching prospect in Vizcaino, and with just one, late first round pick.

This is part of the reason that it is so difficult to evaluate general managers and decisions in baseball. The process is the only thing under control. The result, however, can come out of left field. And unfortunately, particularly in big markets, results receive a lot more attention than processes.

Was Ian Desmond's glove really harmless?

According to Dan Daly, they were, more or less:

● 16 of Desmond’s 34 errors – almost half – resulted in no runs being scored. The pitcher had to face an extra batter, but the Nationals got out of the inning unscathed.

● The last error he made that contributed to an unearned run came on July 29 – the 102^nd game. In the last 60 games he committed 10 errors, but none of them had any effect on the scoreboard.

● His errors cost the Nats perhaps three games, and only one actually caused the winning run to score (May 15 at Colorado).

See? His glove wasn’t that destructive. It just seemed that way.

Unfortunately, Daly's logic here isn't perfect. Beyond the fact that Desmond's glove was harmful enough to result in a -8.8 UZR in 2010, Daly fails to account for the more subtle impact Desmond's errors had on the Nationals. He briefly mentions that the "pitcher had to face an extra batter", but does not acknowledge that extra pitches the pitcher threw at that point to get out of the inning may have impacted him later in the game, or that the pitcher may have continued to pitch as he had been, but needed to exit the game earlier, making way for a less talented middle reliever to enter the game and proceed to surrender runs. Further, the possibility exists that a good reliever would be called into the game, and therefore been unable to pitch in a higher leverage situation later in the week. Obviously, this represents a bit of catastrophic thinking, but the general idea remains the same: in baseball, everything has an effect. Particularly when that "thing" involves giving the opposing team extra outs.